Fail closed without admin configuration and document SMTP operations
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# Email accounts
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`/account` offers registration, password login, email verification/resend, and logout.
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`/api/account/session` returns the current account; other actions use same-origin POST.
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Passwords require at least 12 characters and at most 256 UTF-8 bytes. Only verified
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accounts can log in. Verification links expire after 30 minutes and are consumed once.
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Session tokens expire after seven days; logout deletes the current token immediately.
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Only token SHA-256 digests are stored. Passwords use individually salted scrypt.
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## Runtime configuration
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The existing production deployment reads `/etc/prompt.env` on ces-control. Set its
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ownership to root and mode to 0600. The operator should update SMTP_PASSWORD there
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through a secure remote session, without putting it in command arguments, repository,
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CI output, release.env, or chat. Existing compose deployment reads this file without
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copying credentials into the release directory. Do not run `docker compose config`
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without `--quiet` against the production environment because interpolation shows secrets.
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Docker administrators can inspect container environment; access to Docker is privileged.
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Set ACCOUNT_PUBLIC_ORIGIN to the exact browser origin and SMTP_HOST=smtpdm.aliyun.com,
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SMTP_PORT=465, SMTP_USERNAME and SMTP_FROM=noreply@notice.entroia.com. TLS certificate
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validation stays enabled. Missing SMTP configuration returns a generic service failure;
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resend with the registration password can recover an account whose initial delivery failed.
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Keep AUTH_CONFIG_FILE configured for administrator access. Missing administrator
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configuration fails closed. AUTH_DISABLED_FOR_TESTS is false by default and is enabled
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only by the disposable legacy integration stack; never enable it in production.
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Email account cookies never satisfy administrator authorization. With the current HTTP
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acceptance origin use AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=false; use true after enabling HTTPS.
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Limits persist in PostgreSQL: 10 logins and 3 registration/resend attempts per email per
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15 minutes, plus 300 requests per 15 minutes globally. ACCOUNT_TRUST_PROXY defaults
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false. Enable it only when a trusted ingress overwrites x-forwarded-for; this changes
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the global cap to 60 per trusted client address. Do not enable it on the direct public port.
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Limits count failures and successes. Registration/resend always give the same success
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response for existing/unknown emails, and login uses a dummy KDF for unknown accounts.
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The rate limit itself can reveal recent activity for a known email; it does not reveal
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whether an account exists. No password recovery or account deletion is included.
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## Verification
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ces-control runs crypto/origin tests, PostgreSQL verification-token replay races,
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expired/revoked sessions, concurrent limit consumption and unverified login rejection.
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Production-auth exercises verify that account cookies cannot authorize legacy writes.
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Actual SMTP delivery and visual acceptance at http://8.211.154.134:18131/account require
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operator runtime configuration and the normal manually approved deployment.
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