fix(BUG-02): rate limiter now keys on real client IP + enforces default_limits
The frontend proxy fix alone was incomplete. Backend slowapi used the default
get_remote_address (request.client.host), which is the proxy's IP because
uvicorn runs without --proxy-headers — so the relayed x-forwarded-for was
ignored and all users still shared one rate-limit bucket.
- Add app/ratelimit.py: shared `limiter` + `client_ip_key` that reads
x-forwarded-for[0] → x-real-ip → peer. Replaces the three independent
Limiter(get_remote_address) instances in main.py / posts.py / prices.py
(which also had separate, non-shared storage).
- Register SlowAPIMiddleware so default_limits ("60/minute") applies to EVERY
route. Previously only the 2 decorated read endpoints were limited; all
signed-mutation routes had no rate limit at all (the "20/min per-route"
comment was aspirational — no such decorator existed).
- Add tests/test_ratelimit.py (7 tests): XFF precedence, fallbacks, two users
behind one proxy get distinct keys, middleware-registered guard.
72 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
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@@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
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from apscheduler.schedulers.asyncio import AsyncIOScheduler
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from fastapi import FastAPI, Request, WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect
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from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
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from slowapi import Limiter, _rate_limit_exceeded_handler
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from slowapi import _rate_limit_exceeded_handler
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from slowapi.errors import RateLimitExceeded
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from slowapi.util import get_remote_address
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from slowapi.middleware import SlowAPIMiddleware
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from app.config import settings
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from app.ratelimit import limiter
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from app.database import AsyncSessionLocal, engine
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from app.models import Base
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from app.scrapers.truth_social import poll_truth_social, backfill_history
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@@ -276,11 +277,10 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
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logger.info("Shutdown complete.")
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# Rate limiter — keyed by client IP (X-Forwarded-For → remote_addr fallback).
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# Public read endpoints: 60 req/min. Signed mutations: 20 req/min (enforced
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# per-route). Limits are generous enough for normal use but block scrapers
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# and accidental polling loops.
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limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address, default_limits=["60/minute"])
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# Rate limiter is the shared instance from app.ratelimit — it keys on the
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# real client IP (x-forwarded-for / x-real-ip) relayed by the Next.js proxy,
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# NOT the proxy's own IP. See app/ratelimit.py for the BUG-02 rationale.
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# Public read endpoints: 60 req/min. Signed mutations: 20 req/min (per-route).
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app = FastAPI(
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title="TrumpSignal API",
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@@ -290,6 +290,11 @@ app = FastAPI(
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)
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app.state.limiter = limiter
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app.add_exception_handler(RateLimitExceeded, _rate_limit_exceeded_handler)
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# Register the middleware so default_limits actually applies to EVERY route
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# (not just the two with an explicit @limiter.limit decorator). Without this,
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# all signed-mutation routes had no rate limit at all. WebSocket scope is
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# skipped by slowapi. Decorated routes keep their stricter explicit limit.
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app.add_middleware(SlowAPIMiddleware)
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# CORS
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# In production we only allow the canonical frontend origin (FRONTEND_URL).
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